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Aneela Shahzad

India’s Maritime Strategy and its Implications for Pakistan

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Abstract

The last two decade have seen India’s increasing investment in its maritime ambitions and naval power. Globalization and changing regional/global dynamics have both played their role in encouraging India in envisioning itself as a regional player. This work aims to deliberate on India’s naval ambitions, especially in context of it 2015 Maritime Strategic Doctrine and the pressure Indian naval power and prowess exert on Pakistan’s Maritime Forces, in both the military and the geopolitical context.

Keywords: Maritime, Maritime Doctrine, IOR, Indo-Pacific, India, Pakistan

India’s Maritime Strategy and its Pressure on Pakistan

Over the decades and forced by increasing globalization, India has been emboldened to perceive a greater role for itself in the global arena. And for this matter, India has rightly made the decision of making its naval forces the forearm of its outreach, deterrence and force-buildup in the region and beyond. This work aims to assess India as a naval power in the IOR, and the pressure this exerts on Pakistan as a counter naval power, and how Pakistan is to obverse that pressure.

In the terms of Milan N. Vego, while a naval power refers to the ‘navy, coast guard, and marines/naval infantry and their shore’, sea power ‘is much broader; it now describes the entirety of the use of the sea by a nation. Specifically, a sea (or maritime) power comprises political, diplomatic, economic, and military aspects of sea use’[1]. This implies that in contemporary times, wherever sea power is being effectively played, it is more pragmatic and comprehensive in the issuance of geopolitical thrust compared to land power.

India’s Ambitions

India being the 7th largest country by size, and having a 7,517 km long coastline, has a natural right to think big of itself in terms of sea-power, but its history has not been supportive of such a role, as most of its invading forces had come from its north and did not have much taste of seafaring. The British who had eventually seized India from the sea-side, had no interest in developing naval forces on Indian coasts, as their pillage lay inland and if they had to use India as a springboard for further conquest, that too was further inland not across the open seas. Even after independence, India with its socialist bending, was an inward-looking nation with extra-national interests only with its immediate neighbors at the most. India’s switch to free-market capitalism in the 90s opened it to the ideas of globalization. In this vein, the Indian strategic naval document ‘Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy’ of 2015, has certainly expanded Indian vision from an inward-looking maritime nation to a continental one, and going one step further, into a multi-regional one with India’s acceptance of its role in the emerging ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept[2].

The 2015 Indian naval strategic document has emphasized India’s maritime expansion towards the western extremities of the IOR at African coasts and going beyond that into the Red Sea – and to the other extreme in the Pacific, in engagement with Japan and the island state of Fiji[3]. The document recognizes the paramount shift of envisioning India as a ‘net security provider’[4] in the IOR, which would need India to have a ‘force-posture’, with mobile carrier task forces[5] and sea-based nuclear deterrence[6]. The book identifies the maritime target to be the enabling of India’s influence on maritime chokepoints and the Sea Lines of Communication, vital to the Indo-Pacific region[7], the practice of which would be an act-of-war in real-time scenario.

However desirous – this type of strategic theorization does take its lead from an increasingly globalized world and the changing geopolitics caused by Russia’s rekindling of the Cold War era tensions and China’s threat of becoming the new superpower. These factors have not only united the anti-China/Russia camp but also forced the camp to put their bets on India to counter China’s growing prospects with the Belt and Road Initiative – by pitching the one against the other.

In the wake of China becoming an economic giant, with the Belt Road Initiative’s tentacles penetrating through land and oceans; from continent to continent; with the construction of huge infrastructures with easy loan money; and with making business with friends and foes alike, under the garb of a non-interfering apolitical benevolent – the US and friends are rightly fearful for the toppling of the present world order[8]. India fits-in in this equation quite conveniently when we consider a US policy of boosting up India as an ‘intruding power’ in the region – but not an economic power that could become just as much a nuisance in near future as China is now.

India’s Efforts for Naval Primacy

Nevertheless, to begin with, India’s overtures into the Indo-Pacific have been quite spectacular and India has indeed endeavored to use the sea wholesomely for ‘political, diplomatic, economic and military aspects’. In the IOR, India has established listening posts in Madagascar and Mauritius, and has concluded a landmark agreement with France in 2017[9], which allows India the use of French naval facilities in the southern Indian Ocean – France has the territories of La Réunion, Mayotte, and the French Southern and Atlantic Lands, and permanent military bases in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates. In the Pacific, India’s joint exercises with Japan, Australia and the US navies, strengthening the Quad every day – are also great strides for a third world country such as India.

In the same vein, there are several multi-national formations of which India is a part, and which augment India’s naval strategy. For instance, the IONS is a biennial forum of Indian Ocean littoral states launched by India itself in 2008; the IORA is an association of Indian Ocean Rim countries excluding Pakistan[10], which tells us how this forum must be dominated by India, and how India is using diplomacy to isolate Pakistan. And while India has made SAARC impractical in the last few years, it has tried hard to strengthen with forums to it’s east. Sub-regional forums like the BIMSTEC, BBIN, BCIM and SASEC are being pumped with several plans of road and rail projects, the completions of which would network the whole of Southeast Asia in a workable web – so far work on only some of these planned projects is under way.

India’s Maritime Ventures

Adding pomp to these efforts are some of India’s ideological projects, such as the Act East Policy that aims to strengthen ties with Southeast Asian countries; the Mausam cultural project aimed at remaking cultural links with India’s maritime neighbors in the Indian Ocean littoral; and the Sagarmala Project[11] that aims to making India a truly maritime nation by adding multiple ports on the peninsular coast line and networking them with the hinterland via rails and roads. India has also increased the frequency of involvement in bilateral and multilateral naval exercises. The annual Malabar Exercises between the US, India, Japan, Australia among the Quad, INDRA with Russia, IBSAMAR with South Africa and Brazil are only some examples. The Indian’s MILAN Exercises are hosted by the Andaman and Nicobar Command biennially. 

In 2013, India’s former PM Manmohan Singh recognized India as a ‘net security provider’ to its region[12] and said that India will henceforth develop security relationships in the Bay of Bengal as a corollary to its Look East Policy. This January, the Indian Navy commissioned its third naval base, INS Kohasa, on the North Andaman Island. Kohasa will be a ‘joint logistics node’, and ideally the operational radius of its surveillance and airstrike capacity will encompass the Malacca Strait and large portions of the South China Sea. To connect Andaman across the Malacca Strait, talks are on way with Indonesia for port facilities at Sabang, and with Japan for a cross-service agreement in which India will be able to use a Japanese port and Andaman will host Japanese warships[13].

With all these prospects in India’s hand, we need to find how it will fare on Pakistan’s security and the critical thrust it will be able to make on Pakistan’s naval forces in larger geopolitics and in war scenarios – when it is already trying to envelop Pakistan by intensifying maritime relations with Iran, Oman and the UAE.

India – an Economic Power or an Intruding Power

As far as India’s connectivity with Southeast Asia is concerned, on close inspection, it becomes clear that all Southeast Asian transport corridors fall under the bigger umbrella of the Greater Mekong Subregion-Economic Cooperation Program, that connects Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand and China’s Yunnan Province and its Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region[14], with India as a corollary state. This means that all these transport links that connect ports at the South China Sea to ports on the Bay of Bengal will be just as much useful to China as they may be to India, only China’s economic ingress in this region is already manifolds compared to India’s[15].  The same is with the Sagarmala Project, an ambitious plan of Indian Rupees 8.5 trillion, in which 700 projects had initially been identified. But according to ICRA, an Indian rating agency, ‘about 500 different projects valued at about Rs 8,000 billion are currently in motion already and are at various stages of feasibility study/award process’ and ‘”While about 15-20 per cent of the projects (out of the Rs 8,000 billion set in motion) are already under implementation, the balance portion of the planned projects, are currently at feasibility study stage’, and that ‘there continues to be significant challenges in terms of mobilization of funding especially towards the other two pillars of Sagarmala – development of industrial clusters and coastal communities, where progress has been limited’[16].

This was to show that while the Indian Navy may be making impressive strides in the regional fronts, the backbone India needs to prosper and to make the economy flow through its veins is still non-existent, and progress is slow. In the last two decades India has become an export economy with an impressive growth rate of 7%, yet according to a UN Report, in 2010, one third of the world’s 1.2 billion extreme-poor live in India[17]. This also shows that while Western friends want to boost India as a naval entity in the IOR, they have shown no interest in its socio-economic development.

India’s Naval Capability and Ties

But all this does not stop India from being ambitious for power and control. The capitalistic growth, which scarcely has trickle-down effects for the common man, nevertheless always has the accumulate for further expansion and growth – this type of idealism has led a nation-of-poor like India to pursue the modernization of its naval fleet in a bid to compete with much bigger competitors. So, while Pakistan has a modest inventory made of 9 Frigates and 5 Submarines; India has 67 fighting vessels, including 2 aircraft carriers, Destroyers, Frigates, Corvettes and submarines. While Pakistani submarines can launch nuclear warheads, India has already acquired a nuclear-powered submarine. Already the 5th biggest navy in the world, India intends to have 160 ships within the decade. And while India will be purchasing naval inventory from France and Russia in future, indigenous ship-building has also spurred in the country as around 50 new vessels are being prepared in Cochin, Goa, Gujrat and Surat. Once these indigenous shipyards are able to produce surplus, India might become an exporter of warships which would certainly enhance its geopolitical influence. A large inventory including many patrol-boats would also allow India a more robust patrolling of the waters around it, boosting its Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) footprint.

In the passing decade India has vigorously applied naval ties and diplomacy to reach out to potential friends in the Indo-Pacific. As mentioned above, India is talking with Indonesia for facilities at Port Sabang; there are even stronger ties being developed with Vietnam, who has allowed India to use its Port Nha Trang for port calls and whose sailors India is training for submarine combat[18] – India is also pushing for a permanent naval base in the country. Being part of the Quad, relations with Australia and Japan are ever-strengthening, and especially after Obama’s failed TPP Policy[19], it seems like the Quad is shifting the role it wanted the US to play in the Pacific towards India, even though to a lesser level.

In the IOR littoral, India has developed strong bondage with Oman, who has allowed India to use port facilities at Muscat, Salalah and Duqm. In 2015, PM Modi signed MoUs to develop infrastructure on Agalega islands in Mauritius[20] and Assumption Island of Seychelles[21], whereas an Indian listening post in Madagascar has been commissioned since 2007[22]. India’s port ambition in Chabahar, Iran, which has remained half-baked till now because of US failures in Afghanistan, has also remained a bead in the string that tends to tighten around Pakistan in the IOR.

India’s Nuclear Triad

Since India’s Pokhran-II series of nuclear tests in 1998, India has deemed to create a nuclear triad within its three commands. In time, the naval leg of the tri-services has gained precedence in the assembly of nuclear arsenal. The reason for this has been China’s highly efficient satellite surveillance which has rendered India’s land-based nuclear missiles under China’s target-list, a list it could share with Pakistan too. India made a doctrinal shift of lodging its nuclear arsenal in SSBNs and set them in deep waters. The uranium-fueled INS Arihant submarine is laced with the K-15 Sagarika nuclear-tipped missiles, with a range of 430 miles. Four to five more SSBNs are in the making, presumably with a longer striking range[23]. The Arihant therefore, with a decent firing range, cannot target the Pakistani capital or Chinese major cities.

Pressure on Pakistan

With India’s open enmity towards Pakistan, that has become more vocal in the BJP government tenure, Pakistan cannot be realistic in being oblivious to India emboldening in the IOR and the Pacific.

India and the US have been issuing joint statements every now and then, accusing Pakistan of being an exporter of terrorism[24]. US’ two decades long war in Afghanistan has emboldened Indian presence in that country, and because of that Pakistan has been a constant victim of terrorism on its soil. India’s bid to develop the Chabahar Port as its link to Afghanistan and Central Asia also chokes Pakistan from its west and north, while tensions on the Kashmir Issue always remain high. As Pakistan applies its means and influences to counter Indian growing presence around its land borders, the maritime borders are also increasingly tense.

Starting from its maritime border with India, the two countries have disputed on the demarcation of the borderline along Sir Creek. While India insists to have a mid-channel boundary through Sir Creek, Pakistan wants a land borderline at the west of Sir Creek, as the position of the channel keeps changing due to its being a tidal estuary at the Indus Delta. Thus, the present ambiguous border invites incursions that keep the border patrols alert. On the western flank, just across the border lies Chabahar, which if becomes a geostrategic port India dreams it to be, might be docked by Indian warships or aircraft carriers one day. Across the Gulf of Oman lie the three Omani ports, where Indian ships are often on port calls and free to use the ports facilities, putting the Indians in close range of surveillance and at a posture of deterrence.

In the open seas, Pakistan faces the ingress of Indian naval vessels every off and on[25]. The Indian Navy’s attempt of blockading sea lines around the Port of Karachi in Operation Talwar during the Kargil Standoff 1999 and during Operation Parakram 2001, are constant reminders of Pakistan’s vulnerability at sea.

In the Feb 19 Pulwama episode, the Pak Navy spotted an Indian submarine in its waters and escorted it out without attacking it[26]. But India was not shy on asserting its offensive posture, called-for in its Strategic Document, as following the incident, India had immediately deployed the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, nuclear submarine Chakra (range 300km), 60 ships and 80 aircrafts in the North Arabian sea[27]. This fleet was already stationed in the Andaman Island for a theatre level operational readiness exercise, TROPEX 19, since Jan 19. This type of theatre level readiness certainly puts a lot of pressure upon the Pak Navy, especially when considered as a 1+1 alliance with the US naval forces, that are already deployed all over the IOR, having naval bases in Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, UAE and Diego Garcia. In case of any international conflict in which the two countries may be involved, there are huge chances that India will want to settle scores with Pakistan using its heavy naval buildup in alliance with its friends.

Pakistan’s Counter Strategy

In the regional level Pakistan has gained strength as a geopolitical entity with US withdrawal from Afghanistan, which in practical terms is also an Indian withdrawal from Afghanistan. In China being an adjacent power that has its own issues at India’s borders, and the unfading Pak-China friendship that has led China to make CPEC its flagship project in the BRI, there is strength for Pakistan too. To it west Pakistan enjoys close ties with the Arab world, and special ties with Saudi Arabia. The results of the Afghan War have also moved Russia away from India and closer to Pakistan, making the continent more placid for Pakistan then for India. Yet in the global arena India might be having more stronger friends, who have aided its projection as a naval power in the IOR. Pakistan is a member of forums like the Central Asian ECO forum, and the SCO that help the country’s regional integration. All this and the fact of being a nuclear power, have kept the chances of all-out war between Pakistan and India at bay, however in case of an international conflict, the two states have high chances of getting involved. This gives the Pak Navy both the calm to plan and prepare for a future, and an urgency to stay alert for any unforeseen misadventure on the local or the global scene.

In terms of naval diplomacy, the Pak Navy has made excellent strides. Pak Navy has trained high ranking naval officers from several friendly states like Jordan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey etc. and is regularly on port calls at friendly ports. From bilateral exercises with friendly nations like Turkey, Oman, UAE, Sri Lanka, China, Russia etc., the PN regularly participates in several multinational exercises too. Pakistan’s own multinational maritime exercise AMAN-19[28] with the slogan “Together for Peace”, was a huge success as 46 countries from around the world participated. This naval diplomacy is vital in terms of constantly remaking CBMs with friends in a dynamic world.

Pakistan’s Doctrinal Efforts

Because of unmatched numbers with India, Pakistan has seen its nuclear arsenal as the only and vital strategy to counter India’s huge conventional navy. In enhancing its seaborne nuclear arsenal, Pakistan seeks to regain the strategic depth it has been unable to gain in Afghanistan as yet; and a means to deter India from intruding in its waters. To counter the numbers, Pakistan has adopted a strategy of installing low-yield tactical nuclear weapons[29] on a variety of naval vessels. In fact, Defense Secretary Khawaja Asif asserted in 2016 that we have a superiority in tactical weapons and that we have more than we need[30]. This gives Pakistan an escalation dominance, as with a greater number of low-yield warheads more targets can be taken down at the same time, and a spread-out deployment can give a wider strategic depth in the Arabian Sea.

It should be noted here that Pakistan has kept the first-strike option open to itself, as, in 2002, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai elaborated[31] that Pakistan’s ‘Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India’ and will be used if India occupies a large part of our territory or destroys our militaries, or strangles us economically, or destabilizes us politically. This means that if India, following its Cold Start Doctrine, attempts to make a blitzkrieg attack, like it did after the Pulwama Incident, Pakistan’s declared first-strike policy, would allow it to counterattack with low-yield nuclear warheads, punishing the enemy in a demonstrative way, while keeping the event under the nuclear threshold.

But this does not mean that Pakistan has not pursued a second-strike capability. In May 2012, at the Naval Strategic Force Command headquarters in the capital, according to the ISPR press release, the Commander NSFC Vice Admiral Tanveer Faiz said that ‘the Force, which is the custodian of the nation’s second-strike capability, will strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and ensure regional stability’[32]. In 2017, Pakistan test-fired its first nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile Babur-III, with missile range 450 kms, and terrain-hugging and sea-skimming flight capabilities to evade hostile radars[33].

In 2017, a Naval panel briefed the National Assembly on the purchase of eight modified diesel-electric attack submarines from China, four of which will be procured in 2023 and the remaining four will be assembled at the Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works by 2028[34]. Some papers have also reported that ‘Pakistan will build two types of submarines with Chinese assistance: The Project S-26 and Project S-30. The vessels are to be built at the Submarine Rebuild Complex (SRC) facility being developed at Ormara, west of Karachi’[35] and that ‘Beijing confirmed in October that it would sell eight Project S-26 and Project S-30 submarines’[36] – which leave an interesting query as the S-26 and S-30 are Qing style submarines with missile range of 1500kms.

This news interestingly couples with Bangladesh’s induction[37] of two Type 035G-class submarines from China into its navy. The submarines will be stationed near Cox Bazar, which makes India’s Visakhapatnam, that is home to the Indian Navy’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet and the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) missile test ranges – vulnerable to attack. Also making India’s ability to launch nuclear warhead towards China from the northern edge of the Bay of Bengal difficult.

Partnership with China is therefore a part of Pakistan’s naval strategy. While China’s advanced A2-AD systems will bar Indian submarines to cross the Malacca Strait, its own submarines frequently patrol the Indian Ocean[38]. At the same time, Chinese Siloes line the high-altitude terrain to the north of India, and China tries to ingress in Afghanistan with BRI programs, all of which favors Pakistan’s regional strategy. China’s complementing the aims and targets of the Pak Navy in a time of aggression – is in fact, the biggest challenge and dearth to India’s naval strategy and forward planning.   

The Future

Within the next decade, Pakistan would have procured, in addition to the 8 submarines from China; 4 corvettes from Turkey, two made in the Istanbul Shipyard and two in Karachi’s KSEW[39]; and would have upgraded 3 of the Agosta 90Bs with Turkey’s assistance; and upgraded and purchased several radar/sonar electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems; and moved on into substantial indigenous production in Karachi[40] and Ormara; and hopefully Gwadar would have become an international trading port. PN will also have received its order of 2 1,900-ton offshore patrol vessels from Netherlands[41], one of which will be made in Karachi. KSEW is already producing Fast Attack Crafts with an indigenously built Missile System, the third of which, PNS Himmat was commissioned in 2017[42]. Yet even with all these efforts PN would be in no numerical match with India’s conventional or strategic inventory, who plans to spend at least $61 billion on its navy within the decade[43].

While China does compliment Pakistan, and will opt to combine strategy in case of an international conflict involving the IOR, India has the alliance of the US and friends. US’ highly advanced integrated ASW systems constituting unmanned and sensor technologies can detect, localize and attack enemy submarines, this gives the US an information superiority that is in turn translated into command and force superiority. So, the future war will be between 1+1 powers not secluded ones.

The future is also poised to bring in huge shifts with submarine drone networks and drone squadrons. The US navy launched its first drone-squadron in 2017[44], which was a first step in achieving the desired goals of intelligence gathering, time critical strike, anti-mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare through UMVs. For almost the same purposes, China’s Haiyan-class UUV underwater gliders are designed for underwater combat and patrol[45] and a much wider-area ASW. China’s Underwater Great Wall[46] is another example of laying a network of hydrophone on the seabed of the South China Sea, that will connect with onshore processing centers, giving China a complete intelligence of subsurface movement in the SCS – when the project is complete. These subsurface systems combined with the already advanced surveillance systems that powerful maritime states possess, may create a much more contested naval environment in the future, especially for states that lack in this kind of intelligence. Even if these technologies will come in slow progression, this is the future, smaller naval powers such as Pakistan have to prepare for.

Pakistan being a lesser power numerically, still was ranked 13th most powerful military of the world by US-based Business Insider[47]. The reason for Pakistan’s military being feared as a formidable force is its resilience in battle and its global outlook.

The 2018 ‘Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan, Preserving Freedom at Sea’ envisions the Pak Navy as a ‘combat-ready, multi-dimensional force, manned by highly motivated and professionally competent human resource imbued by faith in Allah SWT and the national cause; that contributes effectively to credible deterrence, national security and maritime economy; safeguarding Pakistan’s maritime interests while radiating influence in the region with global outlook’[48], with faith, character, courage and commitment as its core values[49]. The Doctrine also envisions the induction of force multipliers such as UAVs and SAM batteries and the pursuit of information superiority[50] as its future goals. There is no doubt that real-time readiness, swift maneuvering tactics, resilience and faith do prove decisive in battle – yet the need to match the weapons of engagement is still vital.

About the Author:

Aneela Shahzad is a geopolitical analyst and served as the editor at the Maritime Study Forum, Islamabad. She has authored the books, ‘Palestine and Israel- a collection of essays’, ‘Geopolitics from the Other Side’ and ‘Understanding Geopolitics’ and regularly contributes in different dailies and magazines.

Reference

[1] On Naval Power, Dr. Milan N. Vego is Professor of Operations in the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College. https://bit.ly/2IxHhdL

[2] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – Pg.28, ‘India’s interests and linkages have also expanded over the years, from the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, to the IOR, thence across the Indo-Pacific Region, and now also into the Atlantic Ocean. The ISLs to these areas have, accordingly, grown in importance for India, with sea routes through the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, South-East and South-West Indian Ocean, and the Indo-Pacific region contributing to India’s SLOCs’

[3] RSIS Commentary – ‘Less than 48 hours after Modi left Fiji, Bainimarama hosted President Xi, who is no stranger to the region, having visited the littoral as vice president a few years ago. Fiji and the other islands are eager for a strong Indian presence in the littoral. They know that India cannot match the Chinese, dollar to dollar, in providing economic assistance. The islanders, however, would like to have some insurance against over- dependence on Chinese assistance. India’s presence offers the prospect of greater regional balance in the South Pacific and offers more economic and political choices for the island states’ https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/CO14233.pdf

[4] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – pg.9, ‘The steady increase in the Indian Navy’s operational footprint across India’s areas of maritime interest, with a growing cooperative framework and contributions as a ‘net security provider’ in the maritime neighbourhood’

[5] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – Pg. 162, ‘CTF is a self-supporting force capable of undertaking the full range of operational tasks in all dimensions. These include Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), ASW, Maritime Strike, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Presence and Surveillance Missions (PSMs)’

[6] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – Pg.48, ‘India is developing sea-based nuclear deterrence, in accordance with its nuclear doctrine. The Indian Navy will operate the SSBN to reinforce nuclear deterrence, supported by corresponding operational capabilities and procedures for optimal deployment, in keeping with national policy’.

[7] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – pg.69 ‘SLOC interdiction would be carried out in various areas: off the Sea Ports of Embarkation/ Disembarkation (SPOE/SPOD), choke points through which the SLOCs may pass, and in the open oceans’

[8] ‘China’s activities have been widely seen as the most important element in reshaping the entire region’s security dynamic. Littoral states worry about the increase in China’s activities: this is true of India (historical stakeholder) as well as of Australia which, like France and the United States, has to cope with security issues both in the Pacific and Indian Ocean’ https://carnegieindia.org/2018/02/23/deepening-india-france-maritime-partnership-pub-75630

[9] French Embassy in India – ‘A White Shipping Agreement between France and India was signed on the occasion of this visit. This agreement will enable the exchange of information on maritime traffic as well as enhance maritime domain awareness, particularly in the Indian Ocean’ https://in.ambafrance.org/Indo-French-Dialogue-on-Maritime-Coop-signing-of-White-Shipping-Agreement

[10] IORA.intl. The Governments of Australia, People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Union of the Comoros,  Republic of India,  Republic of Indonesia,  Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Madagascar,  Federation of Malaysia,  Republic of Mauritius, Republic of Mozambique,  Sultanate of Oman, Republic of Seychelles, Republic of Singapore, Republic of South Africa, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,  United Republic of Tanzania, Kingdom of Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Republic of Yemen… CONVINCED that the Indian Ocean Rim, by virtue of past shared experience and geo-economic linkages among Member States’. https://www.iora.int/media/23873/iora_charter.pdf

[11] Sagarmala Govt. of India. ‘Port Modernization & New Port Development: De-bottlenecking and capacity expansion of existing ports and development of new greenfield ports; Port Connectivity Enhancement: Enhancing the connectivity of the ports to the hinterland’. http://sagarmala.gov.in/about-sagarmala/vision-objectives

[12] Ministry of External Affairs India ‘As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh commented earlier this year, India now sees itself as a “net security provider” to the region. This reflects India’s aspirations to take a leading strategic role throughout the Indian Ocean and to expand its strategic reach even into the Pacific‘ https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22468/India+Regional+net+security+provider

[13] Delhi and Tokyo this month began talks on a military logistics pact, known as a Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). It would allow Japan to refuel and resupply its ships at Indian naval bases on the Andaman and Nicobar islands near the Malacca Straits https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-india-modi/indias-modi-and-japans-abe-draw-closer-as-tokyo-woos-beijing-idUSKCN1N31IG

[14] GMS Economic Cooperation and Its Impact on CLMV Development ‘The GMS-ECP is an economic cooperation program inaugurated in 1992 by six countries, namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, and Yunnan Province of China through the initiative of Asian Development Bank (ADB)’ www.eria.org/uploads/media/Research-Project-Report/RPR_FY2007_4_Chapter_4.pdf

[15] Interview with Amb. Rajiv Sikri – ‘Compared to the Indian diaspora, the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia is much larger, very prosperous and controls significant sections of the economy.  It therefore carries considerable clout in Southeast Asia.  Indian diaspora is different…’ https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/108694/SR85-SEARPInterview-Sikri.pdf

[16] ICRA is an investment information and credit rating agency  in India since 1991, the international Credit Rating Agency Moody’s Investors Service is ICRA’s largest shareholder  //economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/63733130.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst  

[17] ‘In 2010, one third of the world’s 1.2 billion extreme poor lived in India alone. China, despite much progress in poverty reduction, ranked second, and was home to about 13 per cent of the global extreme poor. Nigeria (9 per cent), Bangladesh (5 per cent) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (5 per cent) followed’ https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2014%20MDG%20report/MDG%202014%20English%20web.pdf

[18] INDIA AND VIETNAM: A “STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP” IN THE MAKING, RSIS, ‘The Indian Navy now trains around 500 Vietnamese sailors in comprehensive under-water combat at its submarine facility, INS Satavaham, while its Air Force offers pilot conversion training to the Vietnamese Air Force’ https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/PB180409_-India-and-Vietnam.pdf

[19] A ‘pivot’ that never existed: America’s Asian strategy under Obama and Trump, Michal Kolmaš & Šárka Kolmašová, ‘Obama’s practical policies failed to live up to his exalted discourse. Obama was unable to combine support for Asian states and their multilateral settings with his containment policies towards China. His normative legitimization alienated some regional leaders including Duterte, Prayut and Najib, and his actions in the South China Sea failed to prevent China from conducting assertive policies’.

[20]India signed an MoU for the “improvement in sea and air transportation facilities” at Agalega island. This pact provides for “setting up and upgradation of infrastructure for improving sea and air connectivity at the Outer Island of Mauritius  https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-seychelles-sign-four-pacts-to-boost-security-cooperation/

[21] India’s proposed investment in Assumption Island include $500million, development of an airstrip and housing infra for Seychelles Coast Guard https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-and-seychelles-agree-on-naval-base-at-assumption-island/articleshow/64731817.cms?from=mdr

[22] A key monitoring station in northern Madagascar, complete with radars and surveillance gear to intercept maritime communication, was quietly made operational earlier this month as part of Indian Navy’s strategy…monitoring station, under construction since last year when India took on a lease from Antananarivo, will link up with similar naval facilities in Kochi and Mumbai to gather intelligence on foreign navies operating in the regionhttp://archive.indianexpress.com/news/india-activates-first-listening-post-on-foreign-soil-radars-in-madagascar/205416/

[23] The DRDO has developed a twelve-meter tall K-4 Shaurya SLBM with a range of 2,100 miles that is due to enter service in the early 2020s. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/india-building-deadly-force-nuclear-missile-submarines-42532

[24] MEA, India, ‘The leaders called on Pakistan to ensure that its territory is not used to launch terrorist attacks on other countries. They further called on Pakistan to expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai, Pathankot, and other cross-border terrorist attacks perpetrated by Pakistan-based groups’ https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28560/Joint+Statement++United+States+and+India+Prosperity+Through+Partnership

[25] ‘Pakistan Navy announced on November 18 (2016) that an Indian Navy submarine was detected and escorted away from Pakistani territorial waters’ https://www.dawn.com/news/1297189

[26] “The Indian submarine was not targeted keeping in view Pakistan’s policy of peace,” the official said, adding that India must learn from this incident and “move towards peace”. https://www.deccanherald.com/national/pakistan-navy-says-it-stopped-721623.html

[27] https://www.thequint.com/news/india/navy-made-operational-deployment-of-strategic-assets-after-pulwama-attack

[28] “The exercises provided not only medium security challenges but also enhanced interoperability among navies at different levels of technological power to come together and secure a safe and sustainable maritime environment” https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/02/10/china-participates-in-pakistans-naval-drills-in-a-big-way/

[29] ‘Pakistan has made low-yield nuclear weapons to bridge the gap for war that India had created through its cold-start doctrine, Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry said’ https://www.indiatoday.in/world/pakistan/story/we-have-low-yield-n-weapons-to-ward-off-indias-war-threat-pakistan-268997-2015-10-20

[30] https://newsd.in/pakistan-defence-minister-threatens-nuke-india/

[31] Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai was director of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD)—the military organization created in 1999 to oversee the development, custody, and employment of nuclear weapons.   http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=291&tid=30

[32] https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/362833-naval-chief-opens-nsfc-headquarters

[33] https://www.dawn.com/news/1307384

[34]. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1173324/china-supply-pakistan-eight-new-attack-submarines/

[35] https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201608301044792625-china-supplies-pakistan-eight-submarine/

[36] https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/china-confirms-export-of-8-submarines-to-pakistan/

[37] Shiekh Hasina today defended Bangladesh’s decision to buy two submarines worth $203 million from China saying the move won’t elicit “negative reactions” from other countries as it was for safeguarding the country’s sovereignty //economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/59577182.cms?from=mdr&utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

[38] In a major buildup of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean, 14 PLA Navy ships were spotted by the Indian Navy in the region in August. This increased presence which poses a security threat to India is compounded by PLAN submarines accompanying such ships tasked for anti-piracy duties, which the Indian Navy today stated is a rather ‘odd’ duty for submarines. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/14-chinese-navy-ships-spotted-in-indian-ocean-indian-navy-monitoring-locations/articleshow/61882634.cms

[39] https://nation.com.pk/06-Jul-2018/pakistan-to-buy-four-corvette-ships-from-turkey

[40] KSEW has indigenously produced Frigates, Fast Attack Missile Crafts, Missile Crafts, Oil Tankers, Miget Submarines, FRP Boats, Pull Tugs etc

[41] https://asianmilitaryreview.com/2018/11/work-underway-on-pakistan-navy-opvs/

[42] https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/07/28/indigenously-built-fast-attack-craft-missile-pns-himmat-commissioned-in-pakistan-navy/

[43] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-28/submarine-killers-showcase-india-s-61-billion-warning-to-china

[44] https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=102620

[45] https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-tests-new-unmanned-mini-sub/

[46] https://www.academia.edu/30413347/Chinas_Undersea_Great_Wall_Project_Implications

[47] https://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-ranked-2018-2#4-india-22

[48] Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan, Preserving Freedoms at Sea, 2018 pg. 161

[49] Ibid pg. 171

[50] Ibid pg. 173

 

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Abstract

The last two decade have seen India’s increasing investment in its maritime ambitions and naval power. Globalization and changing regional/global dynamics have both played their role in encouraging India in envisioning itself as a regional player. This work aims to deliberate on India’s naval ambitions, especially in context of it 2015 Maritime Strategic Doctrine and the pressure Indian naval power and prowess exert on Pakistan’s Maritime Forces, in both the military and the geopolitical context.

Keywords: Maritime, Maritime Doctrine, IOR, Indo-Pacific, India, Pakistan

India’s Maritime Strategy and its Pressure on Pakistan

Over the decades and forced by increasing globalization, India has been emboldened to perceive a greater role for itself in the global arena. And for this matter, India has rightly made the decision of making its naval forces the forearm of its outreach, deterrence and force-buildup in the region and beyond. This work aims to assess India as a naval power in the IOR, and the pressure this exerts on Pakistan as a counter naval power, and how Pakistan is to obverse that pressure.

In the terms of Milan N. Vego, while a naval power refers to the ‘navy, coast guard, and marines/naval infantry and their shore’, sea power ‘is much broader; it now describes the entirety of the use of the sea by a nation. Specifically, a sea (or maritime) power comprises political, diplomatic, economic, and military aspects of sea use’[1]. This implies that in contemporary times, wherever sea power is being effectively played, it is more pragmatic and comprehensive in the issuance of geopolitical thrust compared to land power.

India’s Ambitions

India being the 7th largest country by size, and having a 7,517 km long coastline, has a natural right to think big of itself in terms of sea-power, but its history has not been supportive of such a role, as most of its invading forces had come from its north and did not have much taste of seafaring. The British who had eventually seized India from the sea-side, had no interest in developing naval forces on Indian coasts, as their pillage lay inland and if they had to use India as a springboard for further conquest, that too was further inland not across the open seas. Even after independence, India with its socialist bending, was an inward-looking nation with extra-national interests only with its immediate neighbors at the most. India’s switch to free-market capitalism in the 90s opened it to the ideas of globalization. In this vein, the Indian strategic naval document ‘Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy’ of 2015, has certainly expanded Indian vision from an inward-looking maritime nation to a continental one, and going one step further, into a multi-regional one with India’s acceptance of its role in the emerging ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept[2].

The 2015 Indian naval strategic document has emphasized India’s maritime expansion towards the western extremities of the IOR at African coasts and going beyond that into the Red Sea – and to the other extreme in the Pacific, in engagement with Japan and the island state of Fiji[3]. The document recognizes the paramount shift of envisioning India as a ‘net security provider’[4] in the IOR, which would need India to have a ‘force-posture’, with mobile carrier task forces[5] and sea-based nuclear deterrence[6]. The book identifies the maritime target to be the enabling of India’s influence on maritime chokepoints and the Sea Lines of Communication, vital to the Indo-Pacific region[7], the practice of which would be an act-of-war in real-time scenario.

However desirous – this type of strategic theorization does take its lead from an increasingly globalized world and the changing geopolitics caused by Russia’s rekindling of the Cold War era tensions and China’s threat of becoming the new superpower. These factors have not only united the anti-China/Russia camp but also forced the camp to put their bets on India to counter China’s growing prospects with the Belt and Road Initiative – by pitching the one against the other.

In the wake of China becoming an economic giant, with the Belt Road Initiative’s tentacles penetrating through land and oceans; from continent to continent; with the construction of huge infrastructures with easy loan money; and with making business with friends and foes alike, under the garb of a non-interfering apolitical benevolent – the US and friends are rightly fearful for the toppling of the present world order[8]. India fits-in in this equation quite conveniently when we consider a US policy of boosting up India as an ‘intruding power’ in the region – but not an economic power that could become just as much a nuisance in near future as China is now.

India’s Efforts for Naval Primacy

Nevertheless, to begin with, India’s overtures into the Indo-Pacific have been quite spectacular and India has indeed endeavored to use the sea wholesomely for ‘political, diplomatic, economic and military aspects’. In the IOR, India has established listening posts in Madagascar and Mauritius, and has concluded a landmark agreement with France in 2017[9], which allows India the use of French naval facilities in the southern Indian Ocean – France has the territories of La Réunion, Mayotte, and the French Southern and Atlantic Lands, and permanent military bases in Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates. In the Pacific, India’s joint exercises with Japan, Australia and the US navies, strengthening the Quad every day – are also great strides for a third world country such as India.

In the same vein, there are several multi-national formations of which India is a part, and which augment India’s naval strategy. For instance, the IONS is a biennial forum of Indian Ocean littoral states launched by India itself in 2008; the IORA is an association of Indian Ocean Rim countries excluding Pakistan[10], which tells us how this forum must be dominated by India, and how India is using diplomacy to isolate Pakistan. And while India has made SAARC impractical in the last few years, it has tried hard to strengthen with forums to it’s east. Sub-regional forums like the BIMSTEC, BBIN, BCIM and SASEC are being pumped with several plans of road and rail projects, the completions of which would network the whole of Southeast Asia in a workable web – so far work on only some of these planned projects is under way.

India’s Maritime Ventures

Adding pomp to these efforts are some of India’s ideological projects, such as the Act East Policy that aims to strengthen ties with Southeast Asian countries; the Mausam cultural project aimed at remaking cultural links with India’s maritime neighbors in the Indian Ocean littoral; and the Sagarmala Project[11] that aims to making India a truly maritime nation by adding multiple ports on the peninsular coast line and networking them with the hinterland via rails and roads. India has also increased the frequency of involvement in bilateral and multilateral naval exercises. The annual Malabar Exercises between the US, India, Japan, Australia among the Quad, INDRA with Russia, IBSAMAR with South Africa and Brazil are only some examples. The Indian’s MILAN Exercises are hosted by the Andaman and Nicobar Command biennially. 

In 2013, India’s former PM Manmohan Singh recognized India as a ‘net security provider’ to its region[12] and said that India will henceforth develop security relationships in the Bay of Bengal as a corollary to its Look East Policy. This January, the Indian Navy commissioned its third naval base, INS Kohasa, on the North Andaman Island. Kohasa will be a ‘joint logistics node’, and ideally the operational radius of its surveillance and airstrike capacity will encompass the Malacca Strait and large portions of the South China Sea. To connect Andaman across the Malacca Strait, talks are on way with Indonesia for port facilities at Sabang, and with Japan for a cross-service agreement in which India will be able to use a Japanese port and Andaman will host Japanese warships[13].

With all these prospects in India’s hand, we need to find how it will fare on Pakistan’s security and the critical thrust it will be able to make on Pakistan’s naval forces in larger geopolitics and in war scenarios – when it is already trying to envelop Pakistan by intensifying maritime relations with Iran, Oman and the UAE.

India – an Economic Power or an Intruding Power

As far as India’s connectivity with Southeast Asia is concerned, on close inspection, it becomes clear that all Southeast Asian transport corridors fall under the bigger umbrella of the Greater Mekong Subregion-Economic Cooperation Program, that connects Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand and China’s Yunnan Province and its Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region[14], with India as a corollary state. This means that all these transport links that connect ports at the South China Sea to ports on the Bay of Bengal will be just as much useful to China as they may be to India, only China’s economic ingress in this region is already manifolds compared to India’s[15].  The same is with the Sagarmala Project, an ambitious plan of Indian Rupees 8.5 trillion, in which 700 projects had initially been identified. But according to ICRA, an Indian rating agency, ‘about 500 different projects valued at about Rs 8,000 billion are currently in motion already and are at various stages of feasibility study/award process’ and ‘”While about 15-20 per cent of the projects (out of the Rs 8,000 billion set in motion) are already under implementation, the balance portion of the planned projects, are currently at feasibility study stage’, and that ‘there continues to be significant challenges in terms of mobilization of funding especially towards the other two pillars of Sagarmala – development of industrial clusters and coastal communities, where progress has been limited’[16].

This was to show that while the Indian Navy may be making impressive strides in the regional fronts, the backbone India needs to prosper and to make the economy flow through its veins is still non-existent, and progress is slow. In the last two decades India has become an export economy with an impressive growth rate of 7%, yet according to a UN Report, in 2010, one third of the world’s 1.2 billion extreme-poor live in India[17]. This also shows that while Western friends want to boost India as a naval entity in the IOR, they have shown no interest in its socio-economic development.

India’s Naval Capability and Ties

But all this does not stop India from being ambitious for power and control. The capitalistic growth, which scarcely has trickle-down effects for the common man, nevertheless always has the accumulate for further expansion and growth – this type of idealism has led a nation-of-poor like India to pursue the modernization of its naval fleet in a bid to compete with much bigger competitors. So, while Pakistan has a modest inventory made of 9 Frigates and 5 Submarines; India has 67 fighting vessels, including 2 aircraft carriers, Destroyers, Frigates, Corvettes and submarines. While Pakistani submarines can launch nuclear warheads, India has already acquired a nuclear-powered submarine. Already the 5th biggest navy in the world, India intends to have 160 ships within the decade. And while India will be purchasing naval inventory from France and Russia in future, indigenous ship-building has also spurred in the country as around 50 new vessels are being prepared in Cochin, Goa, Gujrat and Surat. Once these indigenous shipyards are able to produce surplus, India might become an exporter of warships which would certainly enhance its geopolitical influence. A large inventory including many patrol-boats would also allow India a more robust patrolling of the waters around it, boosting its Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) footprint.

In the passing decade India has vigorously applied naval ties and diplomacy to reach out to potential friends in the Indo-Pacific. As mentioned above, India is talking with Indonesia for facilities at Port Sabang; there are even stronger ties being developed with Vietnam, who has allowed India to use its Port Nha Trang for port calls and whose sailors India is training for submarine combat[18] – India is also pushing for a permanent naval base in the country. Being part of the Quad, relations with Australia and Japan are ever-strengthening, and especially after Obama’s failed TPP Policy[19], it seems like the Quad is shifting the role it wanted the US to play in the Pacific towards India, even though to a lesser level.

In the IOR littoral, India has developed strong bondage with Oman, who has allowed India to use port facilities at Muscat, Salalah and Duqm. In 2015, PM Modi signed MoUs to develop infrastructure on Agalega islands in Mauritius[20] and Assumption Island of Seychelles[21], whereas an Indian listening post in Madagascar has been commissioned since 2007[22]. India’s port ambition in Chabahar, Iran, which has remained half-baked till now because of US failures in Afghanistan, has also remained a bead in the string that tends to tighten around Pakistan in the IOR.

India’s Nuclear Triad

Since India’s Pokhran-II series of nuclear tests in 1998, India has deemed to create a nuclear triad within its three commands. In time, the naval leg of the tri-services has gained precedence in the assembly of nuclear arsenal. The reason for this has been China’s highly efficient satellite surveillance which has rendered India’s land-based nuclear missiles under China’s target-list, a list it could share with Pakistan too. India made a doctrinal shift of lodging its nuclear arsenal in SSBNs and set them in deep waters. The uranium-fueled INS Arihant submarine is laced with the K-15 Sagarika nuclear-tipped missiles, with a range of 430 miles. Four to five more SSBNs are in the making, presumably with a longer striking range[23]. The Arihant therefore, with a decent firing range, cannot target the Pakistani capital or Chinese major cities.

Pressure on Pakistan

With India’s open enmity towards Pakistan, that has become more vocal in the BJP government tenure, Pakistan cannot be realistic in being oblivious to India emboldening in the IOR and the Pacific.

India and the US have been issuing joint statements every now and then, accusing Pakistan of being an exporter of terrorism[24]. US’ two decades long war in Afghanistan has emboldened Indian presence in that country, and because of that Pakistan has been a constant victim of terrorism on its soil. India’s bid to develop the Chabahar Port as its link to Afghanistan and Central Asia also chokes Pakistan from its west and north, while tensions on the Kashmir Issue always remain high. As Pakistan applies its means and influences to counter Indian growing presence around its land borders, the maritime borders are also increasingly tense.

Starting from its maritime border with India, the two countries have disputed on the demarcation of the borderline along Sir Creek. While India insists to have a mid-channel boundary through Sir Creek, Pakistan wants a land borderline at the west of Sir Creek, as the position of the channel keeps changing due to its being a tidal estuary at the Indus Delta. Thus, the present ambiguous border invites incursions that keep the border patrols alert. On the western flank, just across the border lies Chabahar, which if becomes a geostrategic port India dreams it to be, might be docked by Indian warships or aircraft carriers one day. Across the Gulf of Oman lie the three Omani ports, where Indian ships are often on port calls and free to use the ports facilities, putting the Indians in close range of surveillance and at a posture of deterrence.

In the open seas, Pakistan faces the ingress of Indian naval vessels every off and on[25]. The Indian Navy’s attempt of blockading sea lines around the Port of Karachi in Operation Talwar during the Kargil Standoff 1999 and during Operation Parakram 2001, are constant reminders of Pakistan’s vulnerability at sea.

In the Feb 19 Pulwama episode, the Pak Navy spotted an Indian submarine in its waters and escorted it out without attacking it[26]. But India was not shy on asserting its offensive posture, called-for in its Strategic Document, as following the incident, India had immediately deployed the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, nuclear submarine Chakra (range 300km), 60 ships and 80 aircrafts in the North Arabian sea[27]. This fleet was already stationed in the Andaman Island for a theatre level operational readiness exercise, TROPEX 19, since Jan 19. This type of theatre level readiness certainly puts a lot of pressure upon the Pak Navy, especially when considered as a 1+1 alliance with the US naval forces, that are already deployed all over the IOR, having naval bases in Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, UAE and Diego Garcia. In case of any international conflict in which the two countries may be involved, there are huge chances that India will want to settle scores with Pakistan using its heavy naval buildup in alliance with its friends.

Pakistan’s Counter Strategy

In the regional level Pakistan has gained strength as a geopolitical entity with US withdrawal from Afghanistan, which in practical terms is also an Indian withdrawal from Afghanistan. In China being an adjacent power that has its own issues at India’s borders, and the unfading Pak-China friendship that has led China to make CPEC its flagship project in the BRI, there is strength for Pakistan too. To it west Pakistan enjoys close ties with the Arab world, and special ties with Saudi Arabia. The results of the Afghan War have also moved Russia away from India and closer to Pakistan, making the continent more placid for Pakistan then for India. Yet in the global arena India might be having more stronger friends, who have aided its projection as a naval power in the IOR. Pakistan is a member of forums like the Central Asian ECO forum, and the SCO that help the country’s regional integration. All this and the fact of being a nuclear power, have kept the chances of all-out war between Pakistan and India at bay, however in case of an international conflict, the two states have high chances of getting involved. This gives the Pak Navy both the calm to plan and prepare for a future, and an urgency to stay alert for any unforeseen misadventure on the local or the global scene.

In terms of naval diplomacy, the Pak Navy has made excellent strides. Pak Navy has trained high ranking naval officers from several friendly states like Jordan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey etc. and is regularly on port calls at friendly ports. From bilateral exercises with friendly nations like Turkey, Oman, UAE, Sri Lanka, China, Russia etc., the PN regularly participates in several multinational exercises too. Pakistan’s own multinational maritime exercise AMAN-19[28] with the slogan “Together for Peace”, was a huge success as 46 countries from around the world participated. This naval diplomacy is vital in terms of constantly remaking CBMs with friends in a dynamic world.

Pakistan’s Doctrinal Efforts

Because of unmatched numbers with India, Pakistan has seen its nuclear arsenal as the only and vital strategy to counter India’s huge conventional navy. In enhancing its seaborne nuclear arsenal, Pakistan seeks to regain the strategic depth it has been unable to gain in Afghanistan as yet; and a means to deter India from intruding in its waters. To counter the numbers, Pakistan has adopted a strategy of installing low-yield tactical nuclear weapons[29] on a variety of naval vessels. In fact, Defense Secretary Khawaja Asif asserted in 2016 that we have a superiority in tactical weapons and that we have more than we need[30]. This gives Pakistan an escalation dominance, as with a greater number of low-yield warheads more targets can be taken down at the same time, and a spread-out deployment can give a wider strategic depth in the Arabian Sea.

It should be noted here that Pakistan has kept the first-strike option open to itself, as, in 2002, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai elaborated[31] that Pakistan’s ‘Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India’ and will be used if India occupies a large part of our territory or destroys our militaries, or strangles us economically, or destabilizes us politically. This means that if India, following its Cold Start Doctrine, attempts to make a blitzkrieg attack, like it did after the Pulwama Incident, Pakistan’s declared first-strike policy, would allow it to counterattack with low-yield nuclear warheads, punishing the enemy in a demonstrative way, while keeping the event under the nuclear threshold.

But this does not mean that Pakistan has not pursued a second-strike capability. In May 2012, at the Naval Strategic Force Command headquarters in the capital, according to the ISPR press release, the Commander NSFC Vice Admiral Tanveer Faiz said that ‘the Force, which is the custodian of the nation’s second-strike capability, will strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and ensure regional stability’[32]. In 2017, Pakistan test-fired its first nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile Babur-III, with missile range 450 kms, and terrain-hugging and sea-skimming flight capabilities to evade hostile radars[33].

In 2017, a Naval panel briefed the National Assembly on the purchase of eight modified diesel-electric attack submarines from China, four of which will be procured in 2023 and the remaining four will be assembled at the Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works by 2028[34]. Some papers have also reported that ‘Pakistan will build two types of submarines with Chinese assistance: The Project S-26 and Project S-30. The vessels are to be built at the Submarine Rebuild Complex (SRC) facility being developed at Ormara, west of Karachi’[35] and that ‘Beijing confirmed in October that it would sell eight Project S-26 and Project S-30 submarines’[36] – which leave an interesting query as the S-26 and S-30 are Qing style submarines with missile range of 1500kms.

This news interestingly couples with Bangladesh’s induction[37] of two Type 035G-class submarines from China into its navy. The submarines will be stationed near Cox Bazar, which makes India’s Visakhapatnam, that is home to the Indian Navy’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet and the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) missile test ranges – vulnerable to attack. Also making India’s ability to launch nuclear warhead towards China from the northern edge of the Bay of Bengal difficult.

Partnership with China is therefore a part of Pakistan’s naval strategy. While China’s advanced A2-AD systems will bar Indian submarines to cross the Malacca Strait, its own submarines frequently patrol the Indian Ocean[38]. At the same time, Chinese Siloes line the high-altitude terrain to the north of India, and China tries to ingress in Afghanistan with BRI programs, all of which favors Pakistan’s regional strategy. China’s complementing the aims and targets of the Pak Navy in a time of aggression – is in fact, the biggest challenge and dearth to India’s naval strategy and forward planning.   

The Future

Within the next decade, Pakistan would have procured, in addition to the 8 submarines from China; 4 corvettes from Turkey, two made in the Istanbul Shipyard and two in Karachi’s KSEW[39]; and would have upgraded 3 of the Agosta 90Bs with Turkey’s assistance; and upgraded and purchased several radar/sonar electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems; and moved on into substantial indigenous production in Karachi[40] and Ormara; and hopefully Gwadar would have become an international trading port. PN will also have received its order of 2 1,900-ton offshore patrol vessels from Netherlands[41], one of which will be made in Karachi. KSEW is already producing Fast Attack Crafts with an indigenously built Missile System, the third of which, PNS Himmat was commissioned in 2017[42]. Yet even with all these efforts PN would be in no numerical match with India’s conventional or strategic inventory, who plans to spend at least $61 billion on its navy within the decade[43].

While China does compliment Pakistan, and will opt to combine strategy in case of an international conflict involving the IOR, India has the alliance of the US and friends. US’ highly advanced integrated ASW systems constituting unmanned and sensor technologies can detect, localize and attack enemy submarines, this gives the US an information superiority that is in turn translated into command and force superiority. So, the future war will be between 1+1 powers not secluded ones.

The future is also poised to bring in huge shifts with submarine drone networks and drone squadrons. The US navy launched its first drone-squadron in 2017[44], which was a first step in achieving the desired goals of intelligence gathering, time critical strike, anti-mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare through UMVs. For almost the same purposes, China’s Haiyan-class UUV underwater gliders are designed for underwater combat and patrol[45] and a much wider-area ASW. China’s Underwater Great Wall[46] is another example of laying a network of hydrophone on the seabed of the South China Sea, that will connect with onshore processing centers, giving China a complete intelligence of subsurface movement in the SCS – when the project is complete. These subsurface systems combined with the already advanced surveillance systems that powerful maritime states possess, may create a much more contested naval environment in the future, especially for states that lack in this kind of intelligence. Even if these technologies will come in slow progression, this is the future, smaller naval powers such as Pakistan have to prepare for.

Pakistan being a lesser power numerically, still was ranked 13th most powerful military of the world by US-based Business Insider[47]. The reason for Pakistan’s military being feared as a formidable force is its resilience in battle and its global outlook.

The 2018 ‘Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan, Preserving Freedom at Sea’ envisions the Pak Navy as a ‘combat-ready, multi-dimensional force, manned by highly motivated and professionally competent human resource imbued by faith in Allah SWT and the national cause; that contributes effectively to credible deterrence, national security and maritime economy; safeguarding Pakistan’s maritime interests while radiating influence in the region with global outlook’[48], with faith, character, courage and commitment as its core values[49]. The Doctrine also envisions the induction of force multipliers such as UAVs and SAM batteries and the pursuit of information superiority[50] as its future goals. There is no doubt that real-time readiness, swift maneuvering tactics, resilience and faith do prove decisive in battle – yet the need to match the weapons of engagement is still vital.

About the Author:

Aneela Shahzad is a geopolitical analyst and served as the editor at the Maritime Study Forum, Islamabad. She has authored the books, ‘Palestine and Israel- a collection of essays’, ‘Geopolitics from the Other Side’ and ‘Understanding Geopolitics’ and regularly contributes in different dailies and magazines.

Reference

[1] On Naval Power, Dr. Milan N. Vego is Professor of Operations in the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College. https://bit.ly/2IxHhdL

[2] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – Pg.28, ‘India’s interests and linkages have also expanded over the years, from the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, to the IOR, thence across the Indo-Pacific Region, and now also into the Atlantic Ocean. The ISLs to these areas have, accordingly, grown in importance for India, with sea routes through the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, South-East and South-West Indian Ocean, and the Indo-Pacific region contributing to India’s SLOCs’

[3] RSIS Commentary – ‘Less than 48 hours after Modi left Fiji, Bainimarama hosted President Xi, who is no stranger to the region, having visited the littoral as vice president a few years ago. Fiji and the other islands are eager for a strong Indian presence in the littoral. They know that India cannot match the Chinese, dollar to dollar, in providing economic assistance. The islanders, however, would like to have some insurance against over- dependence on Chinese assistance. India’s presence offers the prospect of greater regional balance in the South Pacific and offers more economic and political choices for the island states’ https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/CO14233.pdf

[4] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – pg.9, ‘The steady increase in the Indian Navy’s operational footprint across India’s areas of maritime interest, with a growing cooperative framework and contributions as a ‘net security provider’ in the maritime neighbourhood’

[5] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – Pg. 162, ‘CTF is a self-supporting force capable of undertaking the full range of operational tasks in all dimensions. These include Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), ASW, Maritime Strike, Electronic Warfare (EW), and Presence and Surveillance Missions (PSMs)’

[6] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – Pg.48, ‘India is developing sea-based nuclear deterrence, in accordance with its nuclear doctrine. The Indian Navy will operate the SSBN to reinforce nuclear deterrence, supported by corresponding operational capabilities and procedures for optimal deployment, in keeping with national policy’.

[7] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy – pg.69 ‘SLOC interdiction would be carried out in various areas: off the Sea Ports of Embarkation/ Disembarkation (SPOE/SPOD), choke points through which the SLOCs may pass, and in the open oceans’

[8] ‘China’s activities have been widely seen as the most important element in reshaping the entire region’s security dynamic. Littoral states worry about the increase in China’s activities: this is true of India (historical stakeholder) as well as of Australia which, like France and the United States, has to cope with security issues both in the Pacific and Indian Ocean’ https://carnegieindia.org/2018/02/23/deepening-india-france-maritime-partnership-pub-75630

[9] French Embassy in India – ‘A White Shipping Agreement between France and India was signed on the occasion of this visit. This agreement will enable the exchange of information on maritime traffic as well as enhance maritime domain awareness, particularly in the Indian Ocean’ https://in.ambafrance.org/Indo-French-Dialogue-on-Maritime-Coop-signing-of-White-Shipping-Agreement

[10] IORA.intl. The Governments of Australia, People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Union of the Comoros,  Republic of India,  Republic of Indonesia,  Islamic Republic of Iran, Republic of Kenya, Republic of Madagascar,  Federation of Malaysia,  Republic of Mauritius, Republic of Mozambique,  Sultanate of Oman, Republic of Seychelles, Republic of Singapore, Republic of South Africa, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka,  United Republic of Tanzania, Kingdom of Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Republic of Yemen… CONVINCED that the Indian Ocean Rim, by virtue of past shared experience and geo-economic linkages among Member States’. https://www.iora.int/media/23873/iora_charter.pdf

[11] Sagarmala Govt. of India. ‘Port Modernization & New Port Development: De-bottlenecking and capacity expansion of existing ports and development of new greenfield ports; Port Connectivity Enhancement: Enhancing the connectivity of the ports to the hinterland’. http://sagarmala.gov.in/about-sagarmala/vision-objectives

[12] Ministry of External Affairs India ‘As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh commented earlier this year, India now sees itself as a “net security provider” to the region. This reflects India’s aspirations to take a leading strategic role throughout the Indian Ocean and to expand its strategic reach even into the Pacific‘ https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/22468/India+Regional+net+security+provider

[13] Delhi and Tokyo this month began talks on a military logistics pact, known as a Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). It would allow Japan to refuel and resupply its ships at Indian naval bases on the Andaman and Nicobar islands near the Malacca Straits https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-india-modi/indias-modi-and-japans-abe-draw-closer-as-tokyo-woos-beijing-idUSKCN1N31IG

[14] GMS Economic Cooperation and Its Impact on CLMV Development ‘The GMS-ECP is an economic cooperation program inaugurated in 1992 by six countries, namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand, and Yunnan Province of China through the initiative of Asian Development Bank (ADB)’ www.eria.org/uploads/media/Research-Project-Report/RPR_FY2007_4_Chapter_4.pdf

[15] Interview with Amb. Rajiv Sikri – ‘Compared to the Indian diaspora, the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia is much larger, very prosperous and controls significant sections of the economy.  It therefore carries considerable clout in Southeast Asia.  Indian diaspora is different…’ https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/108694/SR85-SEARPInterview-Sikri.pdf

[16] ICRA is an investment information and credit rating agency  in India since 1991, the international Credit Rating Agency Moody’s Investors Service is ICRA’s largest shareholder  //economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/63733130.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst  

[17] ‘In 2010, one third of the world’s 1.2 billion extreme poor lived in India alone. China, despite much progress in poverty reduction, ranked second, and was home to about 13 per cent of the global extreme poor. Nigeria (9 per cent), Bangladesh (5 per cent) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (5 per cent) followed’ https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2014%20MDG%20report/MDG%202014%20English%20web.pdf

[18] INDIA AND VIETNAM: A “STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP” IN THE MAKING, RSIS, ‘The Indian Navy now trains around 500 Vietnamese sailors in comprehensive under-water combat at its submarine facility, INS Satavaham, while its Air Force offers pilot conversion training to the Vietnamese Air Force’ https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/PB180409_-India-and-Vietnam.pdf

[19] A ‘pivot’ that never existed: America’s Asian strategy under Obama and Trump, Michal Kolmaš & Šárka Kolmašová, ‘Obama’s practical policies failed to live up to his exalted discourse. Obama was unable to combine support for Asian states and their multilateral settings with his containment policies towards China. His normative legitimization alienated some regional leaders including Duterte, Prayut and Najib, and his actions in the South China Sea failed to prevent China from conducting assertive policies’.

[20]India signed an MoU for the “improvement in sea and air transportation facilities” at Agalega island. This pact provides for “setting up and upgradation of infrastructure for improving sea and air connectivity at the Outer Island of Mauritius  https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-seychelles-sign-four-pacts-to-boost-security-cooperation/

[21] India’s proposed investment in Assumption Island include $500million, development of an airstrip and housing infra for Seychelles Coast Guard https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-and-seychelles-agree-on-naval-base-at-assumption-island/articleshow/64731817.cms?from=mdr

[22] A key monitoring station in northern Madagascar, complete with radars and surveillance gear to intercept maritime communication, was quietly made operational earlier this month as part of Indian Navy’s strategy…monitoring station, under construction since last year when India took on a lease from Antananarivo, will link up with similar naval facilities in Kochi and Mumbai to gather intelligence on foreign navies operating in the regionhttp://archive.indianexpress.com/news/india-activates-first-listening-post-on-foreign-soil-radars-in-madagascar/205416/

[23] The DRDO has developed a twelve-meter tall K-4 Shaurya SLBM with a range of 2,100 miles that is due to enter service in the early 2020s. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/india-building-deadly-force-nuclear-missile-submarines-42532

[24] MEA, India, ‘The leaders called on Pakistan to ensure that its territory is not used to launch terrorist attacks on other countries. They further called on Pakistan to expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai, Pathankot, and other cross-border terrorist attacks perpetrated by Pakistan-based groups’ https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28560/Joint+Statement++United+States+and+India+Prosperity+Through+Partnership

[25] ‘Pakistan Navy announced on November 18 (2016) that an Indian Navy submarine was detected and escorted away from Pakistani territorial waters’ https://www.dawn.com/news/1297189

[26] “The Indian submarine was not targeted keeping in view Pakistan’s policy of peace,” the official said, adding that India must learn from this incident and “move towards peace”. https://www.deccanherald.com/national/pakistan-navy-says-it-stopped-721623.html

[27] https://www.thequint.com/news/india/navy-made-operational-deployment-of-strategic-assets-after-pulwama-attack

[28] “The exercises provided not only medium security challenges but also enhanced interoperability among navies at different levels of technological power to come together and secure a safe and sustainable maritime environment” https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/02/10/china-participates-in-pakistans-naval-drills-in-a-big-way/

[29] ‘Pakistan has made low-yield nuclear weapons to bridge the gap for war that India had created through its cold-start doctrine, Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry said’ https://www.indiatoday.in/world/pakistan/story/we-have-low-yield-n-weapons-to-ward-off-indias-war-threat-pakistan-268997-2015-10-20

[30] https://newsd.in/pakistan-defence-minister-threatens-nuke-india/

[31] Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai was director of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD)—the military organization created in 1999 to oversee the development, custody, and employment of nuclear weapons.   http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=291&tid=30

[32] https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/362833-naval-chief-opens-nsfc-headquarters

[33] https://www.dawn.com/news/1307384

[34]. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1173324/china-supply-pakistan-eight-new-attack-submarines/

[35] https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201608301044792625-china-supplies-pakistan-eight-submarine/

[36] https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/china-confirms-export-of-8-submarines-to-pakistan/

[37] Shiekh Hasina today defended Bangladesh’s decision to buy two submarines worth $203 million from China saying the move won’t elicit “negative reactions” from other countries as it was for safeguarding the country’s sovereignty //economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/59577182.cms?from=mdr&utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

[38] In a major buildup of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean, 14 PLA Navy ships were spotted by the Indian Navy in the region in August. This increased presence which poses a security threat to India is compounded by PLAN submarines accompanying such ships tasked for anti-piracy duties, which the Indian Navy today stated is a rather ‘odd’ duty for submarines. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/14-chinese-navy-ships-spotted-in-indian-ocean-indian-navy-monitoring-locations/articleshow/61882634.cms

[39] https://nation.com.pk/06-Jul-2018/pakistan-to-buy-four-corvette-ships-from-turkey

[40] KSEW has indigenously produced Frigates, Fast Attack Missile Crafts, Missile Crafts, Oil Tankers, Miget Submarines, FRP Boats, Pull Tugs etc

[41] https://asianmilitaryreview.com/2018/11/work-underway-on-pakistan-navy-opvs/

[42] https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/07/28/indigenously-built-fast-attack-craft-missile-pns-himmat-commissioned-in-pakistan-navy/

[43] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-28/submarine-killers-showcase-india-s-61-billion-warning-to-china

[44] https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=102620

[45] https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/china-tests-new-unmanned-mini-sub/

[46] https://www.academia.edu/30413347/Chinas_Undersea_Great_Wall_Project_Implications

[47] https://www.businessinsider.com/most-powerful-militaries-in-the-world-ranked-2018-2#4-india-22

[48] Maritime Doctrine of Pakistan, Preserving Freedoms at Sea, 2018 pg. 161

[49] Ibid pg. 171

[50] Ibid pg. 173

 

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Hello, Aneela Shahzad is a Geopolitical Analyst and Author, with deep interest in global politics, anthropology, history, religion and philosophy.

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